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A major theme of Vygotsky's research in the loiter pan of his life
was the theme of concept formation or conceptual development in child
development. He argued that the acquisition of mature scientific
(academic) concepts forms the crowning achievement of adolescsence.
Mature conceptual thinking positively influences the cognitive domain
bul also the aesthetic reactions and emotions. Conversely, the
breakdown of conceptual thinking in pathology will lead to severe
intellectual impairment but also to emotional dullness etc. In this paper
it is claimed that this view is highly interesting but a number of
criticisms are raised. Specifically, it is argued that (Ij the resulting
view is overly rationalistic; (2) the notion of scientific concepts seems
to imply a somewhat static view of science; and (3) Vygotsky was
perhaps too optimistic about the possibility of transfer of scientific
(conceptual) thinking to other domains.
In the last two years of his life Vygotsky lectured and published on many and diverse
subjects and at first sight the collection of these subjects does not seem to make a coherent
whole but rather resembles a disorderly set of topics, as if someone took them at haphazard
from his well-stocked files or bookshelves. Vygotsky dealt with, among other things, schi-
zophrenia and Pick's disease, mental retardation, the peculiarities of written language, the
concept of age period or stage, the connection between education and development, the role of
play in mental development, the concept of consciousness, theories of emotions, scientific and
everyday concepts, development and loss, the problem of the localisation of mental functions
in the brain, and the diagnostics of cognitive development. Apart from that he published
overviews of the main contemporary currents and concepts of psychology and paedology and
prefaces to books by Koffka, Gesell, and Piaget. This impressive list testifies of Vygotsky's
versatile mind and few modern researchers would venture to publish on so many and diverse
topics.
However, on further inspection, it turns out that these topics are much more connected
than it would seem at first sight and that Vygotsky actually applied his thinking concerning
certain key concepts of psychology to various areas. The most central concept of Vygotsky's
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thinking in this period was, indisputably, the concept of development. While analyzing
schizophrenia and Pick's disease he was, in fact, analyzing the impairment of conceptual
thinking in pathological development. When he spoke of written language and play, he was
primarily interested in the way these activities restructure mental functions in development.
Likewise, his conception of localisation was a genetic, developmental one and the topic of
emotions interested him only in so far as it dealt with the ontogenetic development of
emotions from primitive emotions as rage and fear to refined emotions as sadness and
aesthetic pleasure. Finally, his prefaces to Gesell, Koffka, and Piaget were in reality long and
penetrating critiques of how these investigators conceived of child development. So, without
altering for one bit our assessment of Vygolsky as a most many-sided and prolific thinker, we
may conclude that Vygotsky was actually dealing with a limited set of questions applied to
many and diverse fields. These questions all concerned the concept of development.
Development and structure
So, what were the questions central to Vygotsky's thinking and how did he attempt to
answer them? Among other things, Vygotsky wished to know whether it makes sense to
distinguish age periods (or stages) in child development and - if so - which age periods one
might distinguish. He was also concerned with the question of what it actually is that is devel-
oping (the problem of structures), and what it is that propels development. In developing his
own views on these central questions Vygotsky relied heavily on the major developmental
thinkers of his time such as Kurt Koffka, Jean Piaget, and William Stern. But the view of
development at which he arrived - that of the major role of the acquisition and development of
conceptual thinking - was a typically Vygotskian one and made use of notions that he had
been consistently dealing with throughout his career.
We can get a first insight into Vygotsky's (1934a) view of development by taking a look
at his extensive critique of Koffka's reasoning in the lalter's famous "Grundlagen der
psychischen Entwicklung". As is well-known, Koffka (1925) followed Kohler in defining
insightful or intelligent behavior as behavior that is in accord with the structure of the visual
field. Animals do not act on a trial-and-error basis as Thorndike had claimed, but adjust their
actions to the structure of the field. Unfortunately, this définition of insightful or intelligent
behavior as behavior that is in correspondence with the field structure proved much too
general. Other researchers were happy to point out that by that definition many lower animals
and even insects have to be called intelligent or insightful. By extending the concept of
Gestall, or structure, and the idea of insight or intelligence as structural correspondence
(between the act and the perceived situation) to a great number of heterogeneous situations
these concepts lost all their force. The fact that Köhler (1920) had found Gestalten in physics
as well made things even worse. As a result "the Gestall, withered to a logical formula,
appeared at the basis of the world; in creating the world god said: let there be Gestalt - and
there was Gestalt every where" (Vygotsky, 192671982). For Vygotsky this only proved that the
concept of Gestalt or structural correspondence had lost its force as a criterion of intelligence
and that we should seek another principle to distinguish between genuine intellect and the
mental levels ontogenetically or phylogenetically preceding it. No single principle can cover
both pre-intellectual and intellectual behavior and the fact that the Gestalt psychologists
extended their principle to early stages of ontogenesis and phylogenesis in fact proves that the
Gestalt principle is not really developmental*. Being present in each and every stage of
development the Gestalt principle cannot explain the differences between the various stages
and it is, consequently, incomplete exactly because of its broad applicability. In other words,
the Gestalt principle, gives some account of what develops in child development, but does not
explain the dynamics of development nor does it specify the particularities of the different
stages in phylogenetic and ontogenelic development2.
Meanwhile, for Vygotsky it was quite clear that such different stages in cognitive
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development exist and he increasingly paid attention to the role of speech in this context. In
his critique of Koffka (1925) he pointed out that human children do not only live in a physical
environment (Umwelt), but in a world filled with meaning (Welt). The structural, optical field
which makes up the environment of animals and human infants gradually gives way to the
semantic field of human adults, which is heavily dependent on verbal concepts. Whereas
animals are locked in the lue et mine of the situation they perceive, humans can transcend
these boundaries of time and space and plan future actions in imaginary situations. In itself
this viewpoint is rather general and not really original with Vygotsky and its value is heavily
dependent upon the way it is elaborated (see Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991 ). In order to get a
proper impression of Vygotsky's thinking we will take a look at two additional claims he
made that arc of much importance for both the problem concerned - that of development -
and the assessment of his whole theory. These claims are (I) that speech is a conceptual tool
and that the acquisition of speech consists first and foremost in the acquisition of concepts and
(2) that the acquisition of concepts restructures the structure of our mental processes taken as a
whole or, in other words, that it re-structures our consciousness.
Conceptual development
In claiming that speech is a tool and that speech development consists in the acquisition
of concepts Vygotsky was following various and diverse traditions in psychology. At first he
was much impressed by Köhler's (1921) seminal chimpanzee research and endorsed Buhler's
(1919) and Koffka's (1925) view that the stick used by chimpanzees to reach a desired piece
of fruit was somehow comparable to the words children use to reconceptualize the problems
they face. He gradually realized, however, that the inclusion of a stick into a situation leads to
much less fundamental changes than the inclusion of speech. A chimpanzee may suddenly see
how a properly placed stick can be used to solve a problem and in this sense the optical
s i tua t ion may be said to have been t ransformed by this sudden insight . But such
transformations remain optical like in the case of the well-known Gestalt figures that can be
seen in one of two ways and if the stick is not placed near the goal to be reached the insight
may not follow. The in f luence of words seemed more dramatic to Vygotsky: they
fundamentally re-structure our thinking and perception and it is very difficult for normal
persons to undo their working. A chess master looking at a chessboard with pieces literally
views a meaningful situation with the various moves and replies that should be made and can
no more see the meaningless array of white and black pieces that the beginner sees. His whole
conceptual apparatus determines his way of thinking and perception. The same is true for the
connaisseur of art or music. But accepting the profound role of conceptual notions we are
faced with other questions such as how these notions are acquired and how they change over
time. In regarding this problem Vygotsky was at first inspired by the tradition of research into
conceptual development begun by Narziss Ach and later by the work of Piaget.
Ach (I92I) was the originator of a tradition of concept formation research that is alive
until the present day. He presented children with an array of artificial objects that differed in
form, color, size, and weight and essentially asked them to discover a concept (e.g. "big red
cones") he had in mind and which he indicated by a nonsense word (e.g. "Gazun"). During the
experimental session the children gradually detected what concept was behind the nonsense
word and in this sense it may be said that the nonsense words acquired meaning for them (e.g.
"Gazun" means "big red cone'') and that Ach had discovered a means to lay bare the deve-
lopment of word meaning. Many variations in the experimental procedure are possible and
Vygotsky and his co-workers experimented extensively with children to discover the
developmental stages of concept formation or word meaning in such a laboratory environment
(see Sakharov, 1928, !930;Zankov, 1935; and chapter 11 of Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991).
It was discovered that before children reach a mature concept of, say, "triangle" they go
through a whole series of pre-conceptual stages during which they may use the word "man-
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gle", but have in mind something that is quite different from the adult concept. Thus, the
meaning of the word ''triangle" changes over time, much like chess pieces acquire different
meaning as the player becomes more experienced. For Vygotsky these facts were of
fundamental importance as they seemed to prove that children - living in the same physical
environment (Umwelt) as we do - are at the same time living in a different semantic world
(Welt) that only gradually becomes equal to the adult one.
Piaget's (1923, 1924, 1933) investigations of the child's language and reasoning formed
another major source of inspiration for Vygotsky's concept formation research. Relying on
Piaget's distinction of spontaneous and nonspontaneous concepts he developed his notion of
scientific and everyday concepts of which the former are taught in the school setting, whereas
the latter are acquired in everyday life. Ideally, scientific concepts reveal the essence of a
certain subject matter more thoroughly than do everyday concepts as they form the product of
a long scientific development and form part of a system of interconnected notions that cover a
certain area of thinking. Vygotsky's collaborator Shif (1935) managed to show in a cross-
sectional study that the use and understanding of scientific concepts was quite different for
children of different age groups. This again seems to prove that children's understanding and
use of concepts undergoes a gradual development or, in other words, that ontogenetically
speaking "a rose is not a rose is not a rose".
But what then causes these conceptual changes? What propels conceptual development'.'
And do the effects of these changes carry over to other domains of cognitive and emotional
development? These questions had still not been sufficiently answered and Vygotsky devoted
the final years of his life to argue that (1) instruction in school is a major factor in causing the
general development of conceptual thinking; and (2) the effects of conceptual change carry
over to all other mental processes as these form an interconnected whole.
The problem of transfer
The question as to whether school instruction in specific subject matters leads to a
general development of the child's conceptual thinking had been hotly debated in the
nineteenth century. Some had claimed that the study of certain highly valued subjects such as
mathematics and Latin - the so-called formal disciplines (formale Bildung) - will allow the
child to grasp other subjects more profoundly and more rapidly, while the opponents had
contested this claim following Herbart who boldly stated that "Der Verstand der Grammatik
bleibt in der Grammatik; der Verstand der Mathematik bleibt in der Mathematik" (see
Geissler, 1979, p. 241). In later years Thorndike had defended a version of Herbart's point of
view while Koffka (1925) vehemently argued that learning cannot be specific to certain
subject matters and carries over to other areas.
Vygotsky agreed with Koffka in claiming that the study of school subjects has a
generalizing effect and Shif s (1935) study was designed to prove his point. Shif claimed that
she found that the scientific concepts that the children mastered influenced their everyday
reasoning as displayed in her study. This would prove the phenomenon of transfer, that is, that
scientific thinking spreads over other areas of thinking as well. Unfortunately, both Shirs
reasoning and her methodological design suffered from a number of shortcomings and her
major conclusions remain contentious (see Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991, pp. 274-277).
Modern research has not fully resolved these issues, although it does seem quite hard to prove
the general effects of mastering specific knowledge and skills (cf. Ong, 1982; Scinto, 1986;
Scribner & Cole, 1981).
The more general question as to whether the conceptual development of the child carries
over to his or her other mental processes, such as perception and emotion, is even less settled.
Like the more narrow statement about the relation between scientific concepts and everyday
concepts it is plausible and Vygotsky was very skilled in arguing its plausibility by referring
to possible pathological evidence and to various analogies. Naturally, he was most interested
I
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in cases of aphasia as these seemed to indicate a break-down of conceptual thinking. The
finding of Gelb and Goldstein (1925) that some aphasies lost the ability to categorize colors
seemed to indicate that the disintegration of conceptual thinking indeed leads to impaired
perception. This would prove, then, that perception is to an extent language-based and forms
part of the larger systemic whole of consciousness. Likewise, Vygotsky (1934b) argued that
the symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. incomprehensible speech, loss of understanding of
metaphorical expressions) are due to a break-down of conceptual thinking and a regression to
the level of associations. The schizophrenic patient would go through the different stages in
conceptual development in reverse order and Vygotsky even surmised that the emotional
dullness of schizophrenic patients is due to the fact that emotional expressions are separated
from the concepts with which they are closely associated. In sumT it could be argued that the
disintegration of conceptual thinking leads to a number of problems in other areas of mental
functioning as well.
Implications
Let us now try to summarize several of the findings and arguments pertaining to the
problem of development. Vygotsky argued that human cognitive development is different
from animal development in that it is largely based on language. The most important function
of language for cognitive development is that it enables us to master the (scientific) concepts
that developed in our culture and that allow us to understand and manipulate the environment
around us. Scientific concepts are first and foremost acquired in the setting of school
instruction and the ability to utilize genuine concepts marks the completion of early adoles-
cence (Vygotsky, 1931). The influence of mature conceptual thinking, however, is not
confined to the cognitive domain but will at the same time lead to more mature aesthetic
reactions and a more refined emotional life (Vygotsky, 1925/1987; 1933/1984). In case of
serious pathology, such as in schizophrenia (Vygotsky, 1934b) or Pick's disease (Samukhin,
Birenbaum, and Vygotsky, 1934), the thinking in concepts will be influenced adversely and
several of the symptoms of these diseases - emotional dullness, loss of abstract word use —
can be understood as the result of the break-down of conceptual thinking.
The resulting view is fascinating and highly controversial. Vygotsky comes out as a
modern Spinoza (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) who considers the development of
rational understanding based on scientific concepts as the key to a fruitful conception of
cognitive and emotional development. In this view the analysis of the concept of development
is indeed not adequate and complete without the analysis of the development of (scientific)
concepts. The fundamental role of school instruction and education at large is to provide these
scientific concepts and in this sense education really is a constituent of development.
What can we say of this view? Firstly, it can be said to be overly rational or rationalistic.
Some would argue that school does more than to provide scientific thinking in the form of
scientific concepts: it transmits social norms, values, and should promote such desirable things
as mutual cooperation between pupils etc. I think here both Vygotsky's personal preferences
and the pervasive spirit of the time played their role. It was widely believed in the Soviet
Union of the 1920s and 1930s that scientific understanding would bring about a new and
happy society and Vygotsky himself stressed the importance of "cold", rational insight into
one's own actions as well as other phenomena more than once. The notion of the liberating,
emancipating influence of rational, scientific insight cannot be separated from Vygotsky's
thinking and a fruitful critique should contrast this notion with other views of the role of
education in society.
Another point that one might want to criticize is the notion of the scientific concept itself.
It might seem to imply a somewhat static view of scientific thinking in which scientific views
cristallyze into scientific concepts that subsequently have to be transmitted to the new
generation. In this view the scientific concept — e.g. the concepts of "mammal" or "atom" — is
298 R VAN DER VEER
seen as a deposit of the results of years of scientific thinking and in this sense the concept
seems static, finished, or "dead". They transmit the state of the art as it was when the writers
of textbooks sat down to try and write their version of scientific research in some area of
thought. Rather than arguing such a view - which is doubtlessly correct in some respects -
one might suggest a more dynamic one in which the pupils are taught the tools to think more
or less scientifically themselves. The ability to think "critically" might be promoted by
leaching pupils to utilize certain heuristics and skills that may be used flexibly in broad
contexts. I have no doubt that Vygotsky would have agreed to such a view and that his
concentration on scientific concepts was due to historical circumstances and the level of
scientific thought at the time. Modern attempts to teach children to think critically or to
"philosophize" might well be harmonized with a Vygotskian approach.
Finally, there is the question of transfer that has been raised earlier. From his own
systemic view of consciousness Vygotsky was convinced that the acquisition of knowledge
and skills in one domain will lead to changes in other domains as well and he listed many
research findings of both himself and other researchers to argue this view. The more
fundamental views about the role of language and tools in the construction of human
personality and the spreading of their influence to other domains of mental functioning are
still very much alive and form the subject of much discussion (Greenfield, 199la, I993b;
Greenwood, 1992). The least one can say is that there is still a good case for the claim that
language development profoundly influences such mental processes as perception and
emotion. On the other hand, it has been shown that within the cognitive domain people can be
surprisingly inconsistent - as if the mind is indeed built according to the principle of modu-
larity - and it has proved notoriously difficult to prove that the mastering of some skills
influences the subsequent mastering of other skills. The problem of the "formale Bildung", in
other words, has still not been solved to everyone's satisfaction, although new candidates for
such formal disciplines - e.g. playing chess at school - are advanced with surprising
regularity3.
Summarizing, we may say that Vygotsky's view of the role of education in development
is highly interesting and well-argued, but in need of further development, criticism, and
amendments. But this is only as it should be and the best tribute we can pay to Vygotsky's
legacy is to criticize it on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Being a skilled dialectician
Vygotsky would have been most happy with any valid cri t icisms, extensions, and
amendments.
Notes
' Piaget, loo, criticized the Gestalt notion for its non-developmenUil character. See Klavell ( ] 963, p 73).
2 Piaget dealt with both aspects by positing both structures (schemata) and the dynamic principles of adaptation,
equilibration, and maturation
* In this context it b significant that proponents of the independent gymnasium in the Netherlands cluim that the study
of Latin and Greek, apart from being intrinsically valuable, promoles the general cognitive development of children,
while their opponents deny this, but basically make the same claim for such topics as computer science.
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